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The effects of financial constraints on real decisions is one of the most contentious issues 
in corporate finance. To analyse the effects of financial constraints, researchers mostly 
focus on the relationship between investment and cash flow (investment-cash flow sen- 
sitivity).1 However, recent evidence on the investment-cash flow nexus is mixed and 
contradictory, which casts doubt on its usefulness as a proxy of financial constraints.2 
For example, Brown and Petersen (2009) document a significant decrease in investment- 
cash flow sensitivity, which they attribute to improvements in access to equity markets 
and rising R&D. Chen et al. (2012) find similar decreases for US firms but show that they 
are pervasive and observable even during the global financing crisis when financial con- 
straints were supposedly more binding. Based on this empirical evidence, they conclude 
that investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a good proxy of financial constraints. Using 
a large sample of firms from 41 countries, Moshirian et al. (2017) also document similar 
patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity, which they link to the decrease in physical 
capital intensity and income predictability. Similarly, Rocca et al. (2016) document an 
overall decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity for a panel of Italian manufacturing 
firms over the period 1980—2010.3 However, this emerging consensus on the decrease 
in investment-cash flow sensitivity has been challenged by Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) 
who find that investment and cash-flow are significantly correlated. They attribute the 
low or disappearing investment-cash flow sensitivity in recent studies to the noisy measure 
of cash-flow used (earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation-to-total assets) 
and failure to correct for measurement error associated with the firm’s future investment 
opportunities in Tobin’s q. 
1See, Fazzari et al. (1988), Cleary (1999), Fazzari et al. (2000), Moyen (2004), Pawlina and Renneboog 
(2005), Guariglia (2008), Brown and Petersen (2009), Mody and Sandri (2012), Lewellen and Lewellen 
(2016), and Moshirian et al. (2017). 
2This echoes similar and earlier sentiments by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000). 




Motivated by the aforementioned mixed results and the dearth of research on Africa, 
we study the evolution of investment-cash flow sensitivity using a large sample of 5,352 
firm-year observations from nine countries around the Global Financial Crisis.4 This 
developing market context is ideal for examining the effects of the Global Financial Crisis 
on investment-cash flow sensitivity as there is sufficient anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
African countries were not immune to the adverse effects of the financial crisis even though 
they have weaker financial linkages with the rest of the world. According to the 2009 
African Development Bank (AfDB) Report, African countries, including those that have 
limited linkages to the global financial economy, were also adversely affected by the Global 
Financial Crisis that originated from the US. The 2009 African Development Bank Report 
also documents that more open economies such as Nigeria and South Africa experienced 
massive stock market sell-offs, which resulted in the steepest decline of approximately 
67% and 25.7% in stock market capitalisation, respectively. 
Similarly, Kenya had to contend with a significant drop in portfolio equity flows. 
According to Allen and Giovannetti (2011), the 2008—09 credit supply shock was mostly 
transmitted to African economies via the capital account. This is evidenced by the sharp 
decline in private capital and explains the capital flight reported in Kenya. Against this 
background, it is not unreasonable to conjecture that investment-cash flow sensitivity 
should increase as the contractions in credit supply drives a wedge between the cost of 
internal and external finance. Thus, when faced with an increase in the costs of external 
finance and contractions in credit supply, firms turn to internal financing sources such as 
retained earnings and cash reserves. This increased reliance on internal funds is likely to 
be more pronounced in bank-based economies, as is the case in most African countries. 
4The extant literature confirms that financial constraints are more severe in developing countries, as 
is the case with most African countries, due to less developed institutions and capital markets which 
increase vulnerability to economic shocks and limits the firm’s access to external finance (Beck et al., 
2009; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014; Edjigu and Sim, 2019). However, much of the empirical literature is 
concentrated to developed countries, mostly the US and UK (see, Fazzari et al., 1988; Cleary, 1999; 




Therefore, the limited access to external finance, reliance on short-term bank loans and 
internal funds should strengthen the sensitivity of investment to operating cash flow, 
especially around the Global Financial Crisis. 
Accordingly, we posit that firms operating in Africa have a positive investment-cash 
flow sensitivity which increases during the Global Financial Crisis, especially for firms 
more likely to be financially constrained. Consistent with our first prediction, we find a 
high and significant investment-cash flow sensitivity of 0.148. This significant sensitiv- 
ity suggests that African firms finance a significant proportion of their investment using 
operating cash flow as they operate in an environment where access to external finance 
is much limited. However, our further analyses of the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
around the Global Financial Crisis show that investment-cash flow sensitivity decreased 
by 37% from 0.186 in the pre-crisis period to 0.117 in crisis-period. This decrease, which 
is robust to using alternative measures of cash flow, sub-sampling and estimation tech- 
niques, is inconsistent with our second prediction of a marked increase in investment-cash 
flow sensitivity due to the increase in financial constraints around the Global Financial 
Crisis. Our findings differ from Moshirian et al. (2017) who find that investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is diminishing only in developed economies but remains relatively stable 
in developing economies. Instead, this affirms the findings of Chen and Chen (2012) in 
the US and emphasise the need to develop alternative measures of financial constraints as 
economies are increasingly shifting from physical and tangible investments towards R&D 
and intangibles. 
Our further analyses using panel threshold models that are immune to ex-ante sam- 
ple splitting biases of firms into constrained and unconstrained regimes reveal similar 
decreases in investment-cash flow sensitivity. Specifically, we find that constrained firms 
have significantly higher investment-cash flow sensitivity relative to unconstrained firms. 




significant differences in investment-cash flow sensitivity between constrained and un- 
constrained Italian manufacturing firms. Our findings are also inconsistent with Arslan 
et al. (2006) who document higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for constrained firms 
around the 2001—2002 Turkish financial crisis, and Rocca et al. (2016) who report an 
increase in investment-cash flow sensitivity around the Global Financial Crisis of 2008— 
09. Instead, our results show that both constrained and unconstrained firms experience 
similar decreases in investment-cash flow sensitivity during the 2008—09 Global Finan- 
cial Crisis. This finding is contrary to expectations that the 2008—09 credit supply shock 
resulted in severe financial constraints, more so, in developing countries where access to 
finance is limited. Based on our results, which are robust to using alternative proxies 
of financial constraint proxies, we conclude that the usefulness of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity as a proxy of financial constraints has diminished. 
Next, we explore whether some of the reasons advanced in the literature explain this 
decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity (see, Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Brown 
and Petersen, 2009; Moshirian et al., 2017). Contrary to the literature, we find that 
factors - such as agency costs (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Andrn and Jankensgrd, 
2015), the rise in R&D (Brown and Petersen, 2009), the decrease in physical investment 
(Moshirian et al., 2017) and capital market developments (Brown and Petersen, 2009) - do 
not explain the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity that we document within the 
African context. Thus, by using panel thresholds models with unknown sample separation 
and focusing on the effects of a rare exogenous credit supply shock in a unique setting 
(African context), we provide new empirical evidence from sharper tests of financial 
constraints and highlight the need to re-look at the usefulness of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity as a proxy of financial constraints. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses hypotheses. Section 




Section 5 discusses our findings. Section 6 presents the robustness tests, while Section 7 
concludes the study and provides recommendations for future research. 
 
 
2 Literature and hypotheses 
 
Several studies have documented an increase in financial constraints during financial 
crises. For example, a survey by Campello et al. (2010) shows that firms cut back on 
R&D, employment and investment, and sold off assets to wither-off the adverse effects of 
the Global Financial Crisis. Similar adverse effects of the Global Financial Crisis were 
documented by Duchin et al. (2010),  Akbar et al. (2013) and Almeida et al. (2014).  
In a related study, Arslan et al. (2006) find that financially constrained firms exhibit 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivity relative to their unconstrained counterparts and 
that the differences are more pronounced during the 2001—2002 Turkish financial crisis. 
In the context of a developing market where access to external finance is restricted, a 
credit supply shock such as the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis should result in increased 
reliance on internal financing sources. As a consequence, we expect to observe an increase 
in the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows, especially for our sample of firms 
in developing economies where access to external finance is limited. Accordingly, we 
formulate and test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Investment-cash flow sensitivity increases during the Global Fi- 
nancial Crisis. 
 
A considerable number of studies link investment-cash flow sensitivity to financial con- 
straints (see, Fazzari et al., 1988; Alti, 2003; Moyen, 2004; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; 
Khurana et al., 2006; Hovakimian, 2009; Brown and Petersen, 2009; Chang et al., 2014; 
Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016; Drobetz et al., 2016; Agca and Mozumdar, 2017; Drobetz 




of internal and external funds, and the limited access to external capital sources. As a 
consequence, financially constrained firms are more dependent on internally generated 
funds to finance their investments. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Lyan- 
dres (2007), the wedge between internal and external financing sources is relatively higher 
for financially constrained firms, which makes external financing costly, more so, during 
periods of heightened uncertainty such as the Global Financial Crisis. However, Kahle 
and Stulz (2013) find that the effects of the Global Financial Crisis were not different 
between supposedly constrained and unconstrained firms. Specifically, they find that the 
increase in uncertainty with the onset of the financial crisis resulted in similar decreases 
in capital expenditures irrespective of the financial characteristics of the firms. This 
makes it a priori unclear how the financial crisis affected firms in the US, and more so, in 
other countries with different institutional frameworks. For our special case of developing 
markets with institutional voids, we expect investment-cash flow sensitivity to increase, 
with this increase being more pronounced for financially constrained firms relative to 
their unconstrained counterparts. This drives a wedge between internal and external 
finance, especially during contractions in credit supply (see Campello and Giambona, 
2013), which increases reliance on internally generated cash flows. Taken together, the 
evidence discussed leads us to formulate and test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Financially constrained firms exhibit higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity relative to unconstrained firms, with this difference being more pronounced 






To examine the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, we estimate the following augmented investment model: 
 
Iijkt =α1qijkt−1 + α2CFijkt + α3Crisist + α4CFijkt × Crisist 
+ βX ijkt−1  + µi  + ηkt  + Eijkt (1) 
 
where Iijkt is the ratio of physical capital investment-to-total assets for firm i in industry 
j and country k at time t, α1 − α4 and β are parameters to be estimated, CFijkt is the 
firm’s operating cash-flow-to-total assets, Crisist is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one for the period 2008—2012 and otherwise, zero5, X ijkt−1 is vectors of firm-specific 
characteristics explained below, µi and ηjkt are the firm-fixed effects and country-year 
fixed effects, respectively, and Eijkt  is the error term.6  The vector, X ijkt−1, consists of q 
— market of equity plus total debt-to-total assets, Cash — cash and cash equivalent- 
to-total assets, Leverage — total debt-to-total assets and Size — the logarithm of total 
assets. 
Following Hansen (1999, 2000), we next estimate the following panel threshold model 
to examine the effects of financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitivity:- 
 
Iijkt =λ(CFijkt + CFijkt × Crisist)(cijkt, γ) + βX ijkt−1 + ξijkt (2) 
 
where cijkt is the threshold variable, γ is the threshold parameter that partitions the 
equation into regimes, and ξijkt is the error term. For the threshold variables, we use six 
5In this study, we define the crisis using a longer period as this enables us to capture the long-term 
effects of the GFC on corporate decisions. In addition, other studies such as Dang et al. (2014) and 
Machokoto (2020) use a similar period to investigate the effect of the GFC on corporate decisions. 





proxies of financing constraints - size (the logarithm of total assets), WW Index (Whited 
and Wu, 2006), KZ Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010), dividends (dividend-to-total assets), tangibility (property, plant and equipment- 
to-total assets), leverage (total debt-to-total assets), and Z–Score (Altman, 1968). The 
literature informs our choice of threshold variables (financial constraint proxies) (Almeida 
and Campello, 2007; Almeida et al., 2010; Chen and Chen, 2012; Moshirian et al., 2017). 
We use the panel threshold model as the conventional linear model becomes misspeci- 
fied in the presence of heterogeneity or structural breaks (Hansen, 2000; Wang, 2015). 
The extant literature uses an ex-ante sample-splitting or dummy variable approach (a 
cutoff or breakpoint such as (upper) lower terciles or median (mean) of a variable of 
interest) to investigate asymmetries or heterogeneity in corporate decisions (Chen and 
Chen, 2012; Chang et al., 2014; Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016). However, this approach 
is often arbitrary (judgemental). It could introduce sample selection bias (Hansen, 2000) 
as the extent to which a particular firm is likely to be constrained or unconstrained   
is not directly observable (Hovakimian and Titman, 2006). A panel threshold model, 
therefore, provides sharper tests of financial constraints as the threshold is unknown and 
endogenously determined. This approach is in contrasts to the ex-ante sample splitting 
approach that could inadvertently bias the inferences on the extent to which financial 
constraints affect corporate decisions. 
For robustness, we also use the ex-ante sample splitting approach and categorise a firm 
in each year as constrained (unconstrained) if it is below (above) the median distribution 
of the logarithm of market capitalisation (MktCap), firm-age and tangibility. For the ex- 
ante categorisations based on the WW Index (Whited and Wu, 2006), we consider a firm 
to be constrained (unconstrained) if it is above (below) the median distribution of the 
WW Index in each year. The median is used to categorise firms into regimes rather than 




cross-sectional differences between the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples.7 To 
ensure the robustness of our results and facilitate comparisons with prior studies, we 
estimate our models using three commonly used estimators; the pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables (IV). For the 2SLS estimator, 
we use the second lag of Tobin’s q as an instrument to address potential endogeneity and 
mismeasurement errors associated with future growth opportunities in Tobin’s q. We also 
use the GMM estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) (GMM5), instrumental 
variables GMM (IV-GMM) (Baum et al., 2003), dynamic fractional dependent variables 
(DPF) (Elsas et al., 2013; Elsas and Florysiak, 2015), difference GMM (DIF-GMM) 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998) in 




Our sample consists of annual data of publicly listed firms from nine African countries over 
the period 2003—2012. We exclude utility and financial firms, and those with negative 
equity and missing key observations. We winsorise all variables used at the lower and 
upper one percentile to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers. Our final sample 
is an unbalanced panel consisting of 5,352 firm-year observations (873 firms) from Egypt, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. All 
variables used are ratios except for size and the dummy variables and are defined in Table 
1. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables. Panel A shows that the mean 
7Appendix A presents qualitatively similar results for estimations based on the ex-ante categorisation 
of firms into constrained and unconstrained regimes. 
8The general method of moments (GMM5) estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) uses 




(median) investment (I), Tobin’s q (q), cash flow (CF), cash, leverage and size are 0.081 
(0.061), 0.218 (0.203), 0.137 (0.102), 0.159 (0.133), 1.650 (1.412), and 14.787 (14.966), 
respectively. These summary statistics are as expected and in line with prior studies. 
More importantly, comparisons of the pre-crisis and crisis periods show that significant 
decreases in investment, Tobin’s q and cash flow, and increases in cash, debt and size. 
For the changes in measures of financial constraints around the financial crisis, we find 
that debt, size, the HP Index, dividends and LogPPE have increased, while the WW 
Index, KZ Index and Z-Score have decreased.9 This makes it a priori unclear whether 
firms faced more (or less) constraints around the financial crisis, which motivates us to 
explore this issue further. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations. The correlations show that investment is posi- 
tively correlated with Tobin’s q, cash flow, debt and size, while it is negatively correlated 
with cash. This shows that cash flow significantly influences investment as is consistent 
with our hypothesis. The other correlations are of the expected sign. 
 
 
5 Empirical Findings 
 
Table 3 summarises the estimation results of Equation (1), which relates investment to 
Tobin’s q, cash flow, crisis dummy, the interaction of the crisis dummy and cash flow, 
and control variables. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
9These do not provide a firms absolute measure of financial constraint but rather its position relative 
its counterparts (categorisation). Hence, our focus on the changes in investment and its sensitivity to 
internal funds (ICFS) around the financial crisis rather than changes in proxies of financial constraints 





Column (1) shows a significant investment-cash flow sensitivity of 0.148, which is much 
higher than estimates of 0.001—0.05 reported in the literature for advanced economies 
(see, Brown and Petersen, 2009; Chen and Chen, 2012; Moshirian et al., 2017). This high 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is consistent with the notion that firms in developing 
economies are more reliant on internal operating cash flows to finance their investments 
due to limited access to external finance. We find similar estimates of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity in Columns (4) and (7) when we use fixed effects (FE) and instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation techniques, respectively. This suggests that our estimates of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity are robust to the choice of estimation technique. The re- 
sults of control variables are as expected and in line with prior studies (see, Guariglia and 
Yang, 2016; Moshirian et al., 2017), except for cash which appears to suggest that firms 
in developing markets tend to increase savings by reducing or postponing investments. 
For brevity, we only further discuss the variables of interest. 
Next, we examine the effects of the Global Financial Crisis on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in Columns (2), (5) and (8). Our results show a significant decrease in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity during the crisis period. Specifically, the OLS estimates 
of investment-cash flow sensitivity show a decrease of 37%, while those for fixed effects and 
instrumental variables suggest a decrease of 39% and 67%, respectively. These decreases 
are not in line with Hypothesis (1), which predicts an increase in the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity around the Global Financial Crisis. Instead, the significant decrease appears 
to suggest the opposite and is contrary to US studies that report a significant increase 
in financial constraints around the Global Financial Crisis (see, Campello et al., 2010; 
Duchin et al., 2010; Almeida et al., 2012). 
So far, we have only controlled for Tobin’s q in our regressions. Thus our estimates of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity might suffer from omitted variable bias. We address this 




of investment from the literature (see, Moyen, 2004; Chen and Chen, 2012; Moshirian 
et al., 2017). As the results in Columns (3), (6) and (9) show, the inclusion of these 
additional determinants does not change our main findings.  The CF×Crisis remains 
negative and significant, as shown in Columns (2), (5) and (8).  This shows that the 
decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity is robust to controlling for other determinants 
of investment and using different estimation techniques. We conclude that our data do 
not support Hypothesis (1). However, at this stage of our analysis, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that changes in investment-cash flow sensitivity around the Global Financial 
Crisis might vary across firms in a way that supports Hypothesis (2). 
We next extend our analysis by presenting the results estimating Equation (2) that 
captures the threshold effects of financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
around the Global Financial Crisis. Table 4 summarises the results for the threshold 
based on each of the eight proxies of financial constraints: size, WW Index (Whited and 
Wu, 2006), KZ Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), 
dividends, tangibility, leverage and Z–Score (Altman, 1968). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 4, which excludes the crisis dummy and its interaction with cash flow, 
show significant threshold effects of financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitiv- 
ity. The results show significant threshold effects of financial constraints on investment- 
cash flow sensitivity. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of CFC, for constrained 
firms, is significantly higher than CFU (for unconstrained firms), except for thresholds 
based on tangibility (Column (6)) and Z–Score (Column (8)). For the most part, the 
evidence on threshold effects is supportive of Hypothesis (2) and consistent with the find- 
ings of Lewellen and Lewellen (2016). This suggests that constrained firms rely mostly on 
internal sources of financing relative to unconstrained firms with better access to external 




surprising as these firms are heavily invested in physical capital, which should naturally 
lead to high sensitivity to cash flow. The inconsistent result for the threshold based on 
the Z–Score highlights the controversy surrounding this measure as a proxy for financial 
constraints. 
Next, Panel B shows the effects of the Global Financial Crisis on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Again as in Panel A, we find significant and consistent threshold effects of 
financial constraints on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow (investment-cash flow 
sensitivity). This highlights significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in investment-cash 
flow sensitivity based on our eight proxies of financial constraints. The coefficient of CF 
for both constrained and unconstrained firms (CFC and CFU) in the pre-crisis period is 
similarly positive and significant as in Panel A. However, we find that the coefficients 
of the interactive term of cash flow and the crisis dummy, CFC×Crisis and CFU×Crisis, 
are consistently negative and significant.10  This finding is contrary to Hypothesis (2), 
which suggests that the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity around the crisis is 
robust to how financial constraints are measured. This casts doubt on the usefulness of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity as a proxy of financial constraints.11 To the extent that 
there was a credit supply shock over the period 2008—09, investment-cash flow sensitivity 
should have increased significantly if its truly a proxy of financial constraints, especially, 
for firms more likely to be constrained in Africa where access to finance is limited. 
In the remaining parts of this study, we examine whether factors identified in the 
literature explain the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity around the Global Fi- 
nancial Crisis. To accomplish this objective, we test whether factors such as agency 
costs (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Andrn and Jankensgrd, 2015; Guariglia and Yang, 
10This result is not in line with Moshirian et al. (2017) who attribute the decrease in investment-cash 
flow sensitivity to the decrease in the share of tangible capital on corporate balance sheets. Instead, our 
result suggests that the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity is robust as it is significant for both 
firms with low and high physical capital intensity. 




2016), the rise in R&D (Brown and Petersen, 2009), the decrease in physical investment 
(Moshirian et al., 2017), stock market developments (Brown and Petersen, 2009) and 
the noise in the cash flow variable (Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016) explain the decrease in 
investment-cash flow within the African context. The results of the factors explaining 
investment-cash flow sensitivities are presented in Table 5. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
To test the effects of agency costs on investment-cash flow sensitivity, in Table 5, 
we partition the sample into four sub-groups based on whether the firm is above or 
below the median of lagged investment and cash flow. Guariglia and Yang (2016) use 
a similar approach where they classify firms with high-cash flow and low-investment as 
being more subject to agency costs relating to under-investment and diversions of free 
cash flows, while those with high cash flow and high-investment are likely to over-invest. 
Following on Hypothesis 1, the credit supply shock emanating from the financial crisis 
should increase investment-cash flow sensitivity, especially for firms facing higher agency 
costs. 
However, we find no supporting evidence for this prediction across the four sub- 
groups of firms. Specifically, the coefficient on CF×Crisis for the firms that are less 
likely subject to agency costs, low-CF and low-investment in Column (1), is positive but 
not significant, which shows that firms less prone to agency costs record an insignificant 
increase in investment-cash flow sensitivity around the financial crisis. At the same time, 
the coefficient on CF×Crisis in Column (2), for low-CF and high-investment, is negative 
and significant, which is also inconsistent with our prediction that such firms should 
experience an increase in investment-cash flow sensitivity during the crisis. This finding 
is puzzling, especially in the context of developing markets where access to external 
capital is limited. In such a case, one would expect supposedly constrained firms with 




2008—09 contractions in credit supply. Similarly, in Columns (3) and (4), for firms 
supposedly subject to high agency costs (high-CF & low-I — firms that have high cash 
flow but low investment, and high-CF & high-I — firms that have high cash flow and high 
investment), we find that the coefficients on CF×Crisis are negative but not significant.12 
Taken together, our results suggest that agency costs as put forward by Pawlina and 
Renneboog (2005), Andrn and Jankensgrd (2015) and Guariglia and Yang (2016) do not 
explain the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity with the African context. 
In Column (5) of Table 5, we include R&D in the regression model as Brown and Pe- 
tersen (2009) shows that the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity in the US corre- 
lates with the marked increase in R&D. We find that the coefficient of CF×Crisis remains 
negative even after incorporating R&D, as shown in Column (5). Next, in Column (6), 
we examine the changes in investment-cash flow sensitivity based on total investments 
(physical capital investment plus R&D) rather than physical capital investments. Again, 
we find a significant negative coefficient on CF×Crisis, which suggests that changes in 
R&D do not similarly explain the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity within the 
African context. 
We further include tangibility (PPE), the trend variable and the lagged median in- 
vestment (Med-I) in Columns (7), (8) and (9), respectively, as additional determinants of 
investment. We include the lagged median investment (Med-I) as an additional control 
variable in order to purge common industrial changes in investment. Columns (7)—(9) 
show that the decrease in physical capital investment and intensity as put forward by 
Moshirian et al. (2017) does not explain the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
our case as the coefficient of CF×Crisis is negative. Our untabulated results further show 
that both physical capital investment and intensity do not change significantly and in a 
12Managers of firms with high cash flows and low investment opportunities are more likely to consume 
private benefits from the idle cash balances. In contrast, firms that have high cash flows and high 
investments are more likely to over-invest. We, therefore, expect higher investment-cash flow sensitivities 




way that can explain the reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity over the sample 
period as African firms are still heavily invested in physical capital (tangible investments 
or assets). 
Finally, in Columns (10)–(11) and (12)–(13) we control for changes in capital mar- 
kets and noise in cash flow, respectively. In Columns (10) and (11) of Table 5, we find 
that our results remain qualitatively similar if we control for changes in capital markets 
by including stock market capitalisation-to-GDP (SMGDP) and domestic credit-to-GDP 
(PDCGDP) as additional control variables.13 To ensure that our results are robust to 
noise in the measure of the cash flow variable, in Columns (12) and (13), we use an aug- 
mented definition of cash flow, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amorti- 
sation (EBITDA) plus ∆WC (WC – change in working capital) -to-total assets. These 
additional analyses are motivated by Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) who shows that the 
low investment-cash flow sensitivity reported in the literature could be driven by the use 
of noisy measures or proxies of cash flow. Using the augmented measure of cash flow as 
proposed by Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), we find, in Columns (12) and (13) of Table 5, 
no supporting evidence of an increase in investment-cash flow sensitivity during the finan- 
cial crisis. These findings suggest that the evolution of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
that we document is unlikely to be driven by the noise in the cash flow variable. 
Overall, our results are inconsistent with Hypothesis (2) and at the same time show 
that none of the factors advanced in the literature explains the decrease in investment- 
cash flow sensitivity that we document around the Global Financial Crisis in Africa. This 
new empirical evidence suggests that investment-cash flow sensitivity is not a good proxy 
for financial constraints, which highlights the need to re-look new proxies for financial 
constraints. 
13The stock market capitalisation-to-GDP (SMGDP) and domestic credit-to-GDP (PDCGDP) are 






To test the robustness of our results, we re-estimate Equation (1) for each country and 
using 5-year rolling regressions for the unbalanced and balanced samples.14 Table 6 sum- 
marises the time-series and cross-country estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the rolling regression for the six rolling sub- 
periods. For the unbalanced sample, investment-cash flow sensitivity rises initially from 
0.204 over the period 2003—2007 to a peak of 0.236 over the period 2004—2008. It then 
declines over the following three consecutive rolling sub-periods to close at 0.078 for the 
period 2006—2010. Although there is a slight increase over the period 2007—2011, the 
coefficient declines again to 0.080 during the Global Financial Crisis. Additionally, the 
estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity for the balanced sample consistently decline 
from a peak of 0.175 over the period 2003—2007 to 0.019 for the period 2007—2011, and 
then rises marginally to 0.032 over the period 2008—2012. However, investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is insignificant for rolling sub-samples after the period 2006—2010.15 These 
results are consistent with our main findings and show that the decrease in investment- 
cash flow sensitivity cannot be attributed to the changing composition of firms as put 
forward by Moshirian et al. (2017). In Africa, the composition of firms is relatively stable 
as there are few entry and exits over the sample period. Hence, our results are unlikely 
to be driven by the influx of small and young firms as observed in the USA by Fama and 
French (2001, 2004).16 
14We use rolling regressions as the observations in developing markets are limited to allow for mean- 
ingful sub-period analyses. Further, using rolling regressions is advantageous as it allows for fixed effects 
to vary across sub-samples (Chen and Chen, 2012). 
15Appendix C shows that our results are robust to changing the way we define or identify the crisis 
period and including dividends in our model to account for the simultaneity of corporate decisions (see 
Gatchev et al., 2010; Hoang and Hoxha, 2019). 




We next re-estimate Equation (1) using the GMM estimator of Erickson and Whited 
(2000, 2002) (GMM5), instrumental variables GMM (IV-GMM) (Baum et al., 2003), 
dynamic fractional dependent variables (DPF) (Elsas et al., 2013; Elsas and Florysiak, 
2015), difference GMM (DIF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM (SYS- 
GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Using the other estimation techniques as highlighted 
earlier in Section 3 ensures comparability with prior studies, and at the same time, 
provides a way of checking the robustness of our results. Table 7 summarises the results. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Columns (1)—(5) of Table 7, which present results for regressions excluding con- 
trol variables, show that the financial crisis had a significant and consistent negative 
effect on both investment and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Across Columns (1)—(5), 
investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases by 26%—64%, which is in line with our main 
results. These results do not change when we include other control variables in Columns 
(6)—(10). The investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates based on the GMM5 of Erick- 
son and Whited (2000, 2002) are much higher relative to those based on other estimation 
techniques. At the same time, they show a marginally significant or insignificant decrease 
in the investment-cash flow sensitivity during the financial crisis, which is at odds with 
our main results. These results are not surprising given that several studies highlight that 
estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity based on the higher-order moments estima- 
tor of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) (GMM5 in our case) appear to be economically 
implausible at times (Almeida et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2014; Lewellen and Lewellen, 
2016). This appears to be the case in Columns (1) and (6) of Table 7. Therefore, we 
conclude that the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity that we document is ro- 
bust to potential mismeasurement errors associated with Tobin’s q, controlling for other 
and North African (NA) regions experience a significant decrease in ICFS. This finding suggests that the 






determinants of investment, the choice of the estimation technique and accounting for 





This study is motivated by the recent empirical findings that the relationship between 
investment and cash flow is remarkably disappearing over time. These findings are in stark 
contrast to the vast literature documenting a strong investment-cash flow relationship, 
which is interpreted as a proxy for financial constraints. We extend this line of inquiry 
to understudied African firms and use the 2008—09 credit supply shock as a quasi- 
natural experiment. We use panel thresholds models with unknown sample separation to 
affirm the decrease in investment-cash flow sensitivity when its most expected to increase, 
especially, in a developing market context where access to external finance is limited. This 
new and direct evidence from developing countries highlights the need for further research 
in this area as the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivity, the commonly used proxy 
for financial constraints, is diminishing over time. One possible avenue in resolving this 
issue is to examine the information content of cash flow regarding future investments, 
especially during crises or around major economic events. Additionally, future studies 
could consider whether improvements in corporate governance (e.g. the implementation 
of the King’s Report on Corporate Governance for the case of South Africa) and the 
rising corporate debt in developing markets (which is an alternative source of financing 





The data that support the findings of this study is available from Thomson Reuters 
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Total Assets Total Assets 
Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets 
Total Assets Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Assets 
  Cash Flow  Total debt  
 
Table 1 Basic statistics 
Pane A and B present the summary statistics and correlation for all variables used, respectively.  I is physical capital investment-to-total assets.  q  is market of equity plus     
total debt-to-total assets (Tobin’s q).  CF is operating cash flow-to-total assets.  Cash is cash and equivalent-to-total assets.  Leverage is total debt-to-total assets.  Size is           
the logarithm of total assets.  WW Index = −0.091 × − 0.062 × DivDummy + 0.021 × − 0.044 × Size + 0.102 × IndustrySalesGrowth − 0.035 × 
Sales Growth. The WW Index is based on Whited and Wu (2006). KZ Index= −1.002 × Cash Flow  + 0.283 × Total Debt  − 39.368 × Dividends  − 1.315 ×  Cash . 
The KZ Index is based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). HP Index = −0.737 × Size + 0.043 × Size2 − 0.040 ∗ Age. The HP Index is based on Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010). DIVTA is dividends-to-total assets. LogPPE is the logarithm of property, plant and equipment. Z–Score= 1.2 × Current Assets−Current Liabilities + 1.4 × 
Retained Earnings + 3.3 ×   EBIT    + 0.6 × Market Capitalisation+Total Liabilities + 1.4 × Retained Earnings . The Z–Score is based on Altman (1968). The sample 
consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa 
(ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All variables used are winsorised at the lower and upper one  





   
2003—2007 
   
2008—2012 
  
Differences Kolmogorov Kruskal 
Variables 
 
Mean Median Std.dev 
 
Mean Median Std.dev 
 
Mean Median Std.dev 
 
Mean Median -Smirnov -Wallis 
I 
 
0.081 0.061 0.080 
 
0.088 0.065 0.085 
 
0.077 0.057 0.077 
 
-0.011*** -0.008*** 0.077*** 34.287*** 
q  0.218 0.203 0.126  0.248 0.228 0.129  0.199 0.179 0.120  -0.049*** -0.049*** 0.202*** 231.952*** 
CF  0.137 0.102 0.121  0.144 0.113 0.123  0.132 0.098 0.119  -0.012*** -0.015*** 0.078*** 22.955*** 
Cash  0.159 0.133 0.146  0.152 0.133 0.134  0.164 0.133 0.153  0.012*** 0.000 0.048*** 1.295 
Leverage  1.650 1.412 0.868  1.595 1.370 0.810  1.686 1.449 0.902  0.091*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 7.139*** 
Size  14.787 14.966 2.089  14.593 14.822 1.935  14.914 15.087 2.174  0.321*** 0.265*** 0.107*** 33.894*** 
WW Index  -0.734 -0.728 0.198  -0.711 -0.725 0.108  -0.750 -0.732 0.238  -0.039*** -0.007 0.091*** 12.672*** 
KZ Index  -26.558 -4.619 241.219  -13.632 -4.502 33.059  -34.924 -4.759 308.176  -21.292*** -0.257 0.056*** 0.088 
HP Index  -1.732 -1.859 1.011  -1.814 -1.887 0.899  -1.679 -1.844 1.074  0.135*** 0.043 0.084*** 10.419*** 
DIVTA  0.049 0.028 0.067  0.046 0.027 0.070  0.051 0.029 0.064  0.005*** 0.002 0.094*** 11.189*** 
LogPPE  13.374 13.545 2.541  13.135 13.326 2.410  13.529 13.648 2.611  0.394*** 0.322*** 0.096*** 31.701*** 




   
2,108 
   
3,244 
      






Table 2 Correlations 
 
The table presents the pairwise correlation for all variables used.  The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY),   
Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia  (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over  the period from   
2003 to 2012.  All other variables used are defined in Table  1, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five,      
and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
# Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) I 1            
(2) q 0.291*** 1           
(3) CF -0.130*** 0.177*** 1          
(4) Cash 0.050*** -0.197*** -0.365*** 1         
(5) Leverage 0.229*** 0.545*** 0.133*** -0.183*** 1        
(6) Size 0.077*** -0.019 -0.218*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 1       
(7) WW Index -0.124*** -0.127*** 0.102*** -0.020 -0.188*** -0.548*** 1      
(8) KZ Index 0.061*** -0.001 -0.068*** 0.040*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.014 1     
(9) HP Index 0.099*** -0.023* -0.221*** 0.154*** 0.143*** 0.955*** -0.518*** 0.006 1    
(10) DIVTA 0.051*** 0.445*** 0.200*** -0.244*** 0.568*** 0.066*** -0.144*** -0.021 0.063*** 1   
(11) LogPPE 0.217*** 0.012 -0.304*** 0.185*** 0.144*** 0.924*** -0.516*** 0.117*** 0.898*** 0.082*** 1  





Table 3 The effect of the crisis on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise. The sample 
consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa 
(ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised 
at the lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and 
ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
OLS FE IV 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  
q  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***  0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***  0.029*** 0.035*** 0.035***  
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
CF  0.149*** 0.190*** 0.211***  0.131*** 0.168*** 0.149***  0.089*** 0.126*** 0.116***  
  (0.015) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)  
Crisis   0.021 0.035**   -0.085 -0.064   0.138*** 0.141***  

































































  (0.007) (0.003) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.107) (0.119)      
N  5,352 5,352 5,352  5,352 5,352 5,352  4,372 4,372 4,372  





Table 4 Threshold effects financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1). The threshold variables are firm-size (logarithm of sales), WW Index (Whited and Wu, 2006), KZ Index (Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997), HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), dividends (dividend-to-total assets), tangibility (property, plant and equipment-to-total assets), leverage (total 
debt-to-total assets), and Z–Score (Altman, 1968). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise. The sample consists 
of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa (ZAF), 
Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised at the 
lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate 


























Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 
R2 0.152 0.165 0.184 0.168 0.182 0.161 0.198 0.165 
CFC+CFC×Crisis 




Financial Constraint Size WW Index KZ Index HP Index Dividends Tangibility Leverage Z–Score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Panel A: The effects of financial constraints 
CFC 0.145*** 0.191*** 0.152*** 0.237*** 0.157*** 0.077*** 0.226*** 0.037* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) 
CFU 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.055*** 0.101*** 0.061*** 0.151*** 0.088*** 0.127*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 2,730 
 Threshold 14.920 0.714 6.283 0.695 0.040 14.270 -0.194 3.041 
Threshold (%) 36 31 55 16 60 52 33 18 
Probability (p-value) [0.052] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
CFC=CFU [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Panel B: The effects of financial constraints and the crisis 
CFC 0.107*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.335*** 0.206*** 0.097*** 0.280*** 0.084*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) 
CFC×Crisis -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.140*** -0.191*** -0.125*** -0.063*** -0.142*** -0.287*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) (0.049) 
CFU 0.171*** 0.106*** 0.069*** 0.126*** 0.081*** 0.195*** 0.106*** 0.153*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
CFU×Crisis -0.082*** -0.039** -0.041** -0.056*** -0.037** -0.097*** -0.041** -0.070*** 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Threshold 14.870 0.714 6.283 0.695 0.040 14.270 -0.194 2.885 
Threshold (%) 35 31 55 16 60 52 33 15 
Probability (p-value) [0.107] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CFC=CFU [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CFC×Crisis=CFU×Crisis [0.096] [0.302] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.000] [0.000] 
=CFU+CFU×Crisis [0.055] [0.000] [0.014] [0.004] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 




Table 5 Factors affecting investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1).  Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise.  R&D         
is research and development-to-total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment-to-total assets. Trend is the time trend variable. Med-I is the median industrial 
investment in each year. SMGDP is the stock market capitalisation-to-GDP and PDCGDP is the domestic credit-to-GDP. SMGDP and PDCGDP are from World Bank 
Database. ∆Equity is the net proceeds from new equity issues. ∆Debt is the change in total debt. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from 
Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from 
Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors 
that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
CF-I 
Low CF Low CF High CF High CF  











Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11)  (12) (13)  
CF 0.079*** 0.148*** 0.249* 0.107*** 0.160*** 0.160***  0.159*** 0.159*** 0.160***  0.116*** 0.166***  0.090*** 0.090***  
 (0.030) (0.057) (0.134) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.019) (0.032)  (0.026) (0.026)  
Crisis 0.008 0.052** 0.053 0.076*** 0.021*** 0.022***  0.020*** 0.018 0.021***  0.005 0.025***  0.012 0.003  




























R&D     -0.020             
PPE        0.029 0.029         
        (0.021) (0.021)         
Trend         0.025         
Med-I 
        (0.204) 
0.013 
       
SMGDP 
         (0.051)  
-0.000 
     
            (0.000)      
PDCGDP            0.001      
∆Equity 
           (0.001) 
-0.070** 
    
∆Debt 
            (0.030) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N 1,592 924 911 1,563 5,352 5,352  5,352 5,352 5,352  5,068 5,352  5,352 5,352  




Table 6 Time series estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) using 5-year rolling regressions over the sample period for all firms, and the unbalanced and balanced samples. 
The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), 
South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and 
are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 
one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Full sample Unbalanced sample Balanced sample 
Period  CF SE R2 N  CF SE R2 N  CF SE R2 N  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
2003—2007 0.188*** (0.058) 0.711 2,108 0.204*** (0.064) 0.814 743 0.175** (0.084) 0.633 1,365 
2004—2008 0.180*** (0.057) 0.725 2,297 0.236*** (0.088) 0.795 932 0.140** (0.071) 0.656 1,365 
2005—2009 0.132*** (0.040) 0.703 2,556 0.162*** (0.046) 0.753 1,191 0.101* (0.056) 0.640 1,365 
2006—2010 0.054** (0.021) 0.706 2,876 0.078* (0.041) 0.718 1,511 0.027 (0.017) 0.698 1,365 
2007—2011 0.056*** (0.020) 0.688 3,145 0.093*** (0.030) 0.700 1,780 0.019 (0.020) 0.676 1,365 
2008—2012 0.047*** (0.018) 0.695 3,244 0.080*** (0.024) 0.707 1,879 0.032 (0.024) 0.686 1,365 












Table 7 Alternatives estimations of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) using the GMM estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) (GMM5), instrumental variables GMM (IV-GMM) 
(Baum et al., 2003), dynamic fractional dependent variables (DPF) (Elsas et al., 2013;  Elsas  and Florysiak,  2015),  difference  GMM (DIF-GMM)  (Arellano  and  Bond,  
1991) and system GMM (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise.            
The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA),     
South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and 
are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. τ 2 is an index of measurement quality of Tobin’s q which ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating a poor 
proxy and one indicating a very good proxy. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Estimation GMM5 IV-GMM DPF DIF-GMM SYS-GMM GMM5 IV-GMM DPF DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Iitj 1 0.339*** 0.435*** 0.387*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.385*** 
(0.019) (0.143) (0.092) (0.019) (0.129) (0.092) 
q -0.004 0.037*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.005** -0.043*** 0.039*** 0.009*** 0.005* 0.005** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
CF 0.223*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.272*** 0.202*** 0.366*** 0.139*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 0.202*** 
(0.035) (0.046) (0.014) (0.063) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.015) (0.052) (0.039) 
Crisis 0.003 -0.001 0.011* 0.042*** 0.018** -0.047*** 0.005 0.019*** 0.118*** 0.017** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.022) (0.008) 
CF   Crisis -0.058* -0.099** -0.082*** -0.173*** -0.118*** -0.018 -0.107** -0.063*** -0.100** -0.118*** 
(0.031) (0.050) (0.016) (0.047) (0.033) (0.030) (0.050) (0.016) (0.040) (0.032) 
Cash -0.090*** -0.043*** -0.020 0.068*** -0.038*** 
(0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) 
Leverage 0.005 -0.016 -0.050*** -0.103*** -0.024** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010) 
Size 0.004*** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.097*** 0.001 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) 
N 5,352 4,479 4,479 4,479 5,352 5,352 4,479 4,479 4,479 5,352 
R2 0.086 0.092 
τ 0.590 0.362 
ρ 0.199 0.153 0.183 
AR(2) 0.131 0.092 0.506 0.083 
AR(2) p-value [0.896] [0.927] [0.613] [0.934] 
Sargan 9.606 8.832 8.310 8.911 
Sargan p-value [0.212] [0.357] [0.306] [0.350] 
Hansen 6.128 6.466 8.375 6.578 







Appendix A Alternative estimates of the effects of financial constraints on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise. FCD is a 
dummy variable that takes a value if one if a firm is categorised as constrained and zero otherwise.  A firm is categorised as being constrained if it is below the median   
of size (logarithm of sales), dividends (dividend-to-total assets), profitability (profit-to-total assets) and tangibility (total debt-to-total assets), and above the median of 
WW Index (Whited and Wu, 2006) and leverage (total debt-to-total assets). WW Index =−0.091 × Cash Flow − 0.062 × DivDummy + 0.021 × Total debt . The sample 
consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa 
(ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised 
at the lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and 
ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Financial Constraint Size WW Index KZ Index HP Index Dividends Tangibility Leverage Z–Score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CF 0.174*** 0.131*** 0.090*** 0.175*** 0.141*** 0.165*** 0.103*** 0.150*** 
(0.041) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.038) (0.039) (0.019) (0.037) 
Crisis 0.022** 0.015** 0.016** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.017*** 0.020** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
CF×Crisis -0.073** -0.039** -0.030* -0.063** -0.073** -0.059* -0.053*** -0.051* 





































































































Appendix B Sub-period analyses of the threshold effects of financial constraints 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1). Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise. The 
threshold variables are firm-size (logarithm of sales), WW Index (Whited and Wu, 2006), KZ Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), 
dividends (dividend-to-total assets), tangibility (property, plant and equipment-to-total assets), leverage (total debt-to-total assets), and Z–Score (Altman, 1968). The 
sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South 
Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are 
winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. p-values are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, 
























Financial Constraint Size WW Index KZ Index HP Index Dividends Tangibility Leverage Z–Score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Panel A: 2003-2007 (Pre-crisis) 
CFC 0.258*** 0.278*** 0.294*** 0.003 0.227*** 0.244*** 0.369*** 0.077*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
CFU 0.029 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.261*** 0.091*** 0.062** 0.143*** 0.205*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630 1,630 
 Threshold 15.340 0.714 1.588 1.577 0.040 14.520 -0.194 3.055 
Threshold (%) 56 41 27 38 64 69 32 24 
Probability (p-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CFC=CFU [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Panel B: 2008—2012 (Crisis) 
CFC 0.182*** 0.080*** 0.010 -0.016 0.073*** 0.171*** 0.141*** -0.109*** 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) 
CFU -0.007 0.017 0.037** 0.145*** 0.021 0.009 0.013 0.072*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 2,180 
 Threshold 14.490 0.734 1.633 1.942 0.023 12.060 -0.217 2.891 
Threshold (%) 34 41 28 62 36 20 28 18 
Probability (p-value) [0.000] [0.205] [0.150] [0.000] [0.049] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
CFC=CFU [0.000] [0.006] [0.136] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
0.225 0.220 0.218 0.222 0.223 0.210 0.256 0.198 
 





Appendix C Alternative crisis periods, other models and regional samples 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1). For Columns (1)—(2), the Crisis dummy variable that takes a 
value if one for the period 2007-2009 and zero otherwise. For Columns (3)—(4), the Crisis dummy variable that takes a 
value if one for the period 2008—2009 and zero otherwise.  For Columns (5)—(7), the Crisis dummy variable that takes 
a value if one for the period 2008—2012 and zero otherwise. Div-Model includes dividends (DIV T A) as an additional 
determinant of investment in Equation (1). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is composed of firms in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. North Africa (NA) is composed of firms in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The sample 
consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), 
Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over 
the period from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised at the lower and upper 
one percentiles. Standard errors that are robust heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance 
at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Sample 2003—2009 2003—2012 






Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  
q 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.015***  0.018***  0.004  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
CF 0.165*** 0.146*** 0.162*** 0.150*** 0.149***  0.114***  0.574**  
(0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.225)  
Crisis 0.089*** 0.087*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.065  -0.076  0.149***  



















































N 2,601 2,601 2,488 2,488 5,352  4,538  814  































































Figure A.1 The evolution of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
The figure plots estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity from Equation (1) using 5-year rolling regressions for all firms 
(All), unbalanced sample (Unbalanced) and balanced sample (Balanced) over the sample period. The sample consists of 
listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco 
(MAR), Nigeria (NGA), South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period 
from 2003 to 2012. All other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. 





























Figure A.2 The information content of cash flow 
The figure plots estimates of q-cash flow sensitivity using 5-year rolling regressions for all firms (All), unbalanced sample 
(Unbalanced) and balanced sample (Balanced) over the sample period. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non- 
financial firms from Ivory Coast (CIV), Egypt (EGY), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA),     
South Africa (ZAF), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia (ZMB) drawn from Datastream over the period from 2003 to 2012. All 
other variables used are defined in Table 1, and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. 
